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Abstract
This article studies the effects of financial shocks on the labor market when
participation in the labor force is endogenous. Previous research concerning
endogenous participation produced models that generated a counterfactually
procyclical unemployment rate and a positively sloped Beveridge curve. This
paper shows that collateral constraints alone are not able to produce cor-
relations in line with the data. However, financial shocks, that change the
collateral requirements, are responsible for most of the movements on the la-
bor market and generate a countercyclical unemployment and a negatively
slopped Beveridge curve.
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1 Introduction
The Great recession of 2008 showed the importance of understanding the effects
of financial frictions on the economy. A significant drop in the employment rate
as well as in GDP was accompanied by a tightening of credit conditions and a
delayed decrease in the labor market participation rate. However, the 2008 financial
crisis was not an isolated episode. As it can be seen in Figure 1, which shows
the detrended1 GDP, employment, labor force and tightening standards for the US
economy, a similar pattern occurred in previous recessions even if on a smaller scale.
The economy and the labor market are not immune to fluctuations in the finan-
cial market. From Figure 1 we can see that there is a negative correlation between
tightening standards in the financial market, measured as the net percentage of
domestic banks tightening standards for commercial and industrial Loans, and the
cyclical component of GDP and the employment rate.
According to Figure 2, which shows the cross correlation of GDP with selected
labor market variables, the labor force participation rate is procyclical. In addition,
the evidence, provided by Elsby et al (2015) [10], shows that up to a third of labor
market volatility can be explained by the participation margin. Furthermore, pol-
icy makers are increasingly interested in the movements in the labor participation
margin (Bernanke(2012) [2], Draghi (2014)[8] and Yellen (2014) [28]).
This article investigates the interaction of labor market participation, financial
frictions and the business cycle and aims to understand what the aggregate impli-
cations of endogenous labor participation are, amid financial shocks.
The model developed in this article is able to generate moments that are on par
with the data. That is, a negatively slopped Baveridge curve, a counter cyclical un-
employment rate, a pro cyclical labor force participation rate and less volatile wages.
Furthermore, the introduction of the participation margin gives the household and
extra instrument to smooth its consumption. As a consequence, the volatility of
unemployment and the labor market tightness is reduced. This result gives an ex-
tra strength to the Shimer puzzle since models would overestimate the volatility of
unemployment when the participation margin is absent.
The following model generates a frictional financial market by adding a collateral
constraint, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) [17] and Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
[15], to the investment decision of firms. The labor market friction with endogenous
participation is similar to the ones in Shimer (2013) [25] and Campolmi and Gnocchi
(2016) [6].
1Variables detrended following Hamilton (2017)[14]
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Figure 1: US Business cycle
The financial frictions of this model are closely related to the seminal paper of
Jermann and Quadrini (2012) [15]. The authors set up a framework where firms
are also bind to a collateral constraint. Furthermore, bonds and the payment of
dividends are also subject to frictions. They show that when an economy is hit
by a negative financial shock, firms need to decrease investments and the number
of workers. The work of Gar´ın (2015) studies the effect of financial shocks on un-
employment dynamics when the labor market is subject to search and matching
frictions. In addition, Zanetti (2017) studies the interaction of financial and labor
market frictions by incorporating a job destruction shock. Epstein et al (2017) [11]
also have model with collateral constrains and a labor market with on the job search.
This paper aims to improve the literature by adding a participation margin to the
collateral constrain and frictional labor market framework.
Table 1 presents the correlation matrix of the detrended variables seen in the US
data. The key points of this table are that there is a negative correlation between
unemployment and vacancies, the unemployment rate is strongly counter-cyclical,
and the labor force participation is pro-cyclical. The Filter suggested by Hamilton
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Table 1: Correlation matrix (Data)
Y U v θ n w lf I
Y 1 -0.82 0.80 0.84 0.86 0.53 0.46 0.82
U 1 -0.86 -0.96 -0.83 -0.67 -0.32 -0.76
v 1 0.94 0.79 -0.64 0.38 0.70
θ 1 0.83 -0.13 0.36 0.67
n 1 -0.15 0.63 0.74
w 1 -0.58 -0.14
lf 1 0.27
Figure 2: Cross-correlation
(2017) [14] generates a correlation between GDP and the labor force that is four
times higher than the one produced with the HP-filter.
One problem of search models with endogenous labor supply is that they pro-
duce a positive correlation between unemployment and vacancies (Ravn (2008) [21],
Veracierto (2008) [26]). That is, the Beveridge curve is positively sloped. The in-
tuition behind this result is the following, if a firm increases the level of vacancies,
because of a positive shock, the job finding probability and the resulting wages will
also go up. This in turn increases the benefit of participating in the labor market.
As a result, the unemployment goes up.
Several authors tried to overcome this problem. Ebbel (2011) [9] proposes a
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new calibration strategy. Another approach is to make wages less volatile to curb
the incentives of nonparticipants or job seekers to join or leave the labor market.
Shimer (2013) [25] showed that models with endogenous participation are able to
produce the expected labor market statistics when wages are rigid. Burda et al
(2016) [5] introduced countercyclical payroll taxes, resulting in a decrease in net
wage volatility, to generate a negatively slopped Beveridge curve.
The following model is able to tackle all three problems with models with en-
dogenous participation, namely: the negative correlation between unemployment
and vacancies; the countercyclicality of unemployment, and the procyclicality of the
labor force. The introduction of financial frictions enables the generation of these
results. In addition, an unemployment insurance rule that takes into account the
unemployed previous history helps bring the moments closer to the data.
Another benefit of the introduction of financial frictions to this kind of modeling
is that it is normally capable of generating more volatility in labor market variables
(Petrosky-Nadeau (2014) [19]). The following model produces high volatility in
unemployment and vacancies. However, the introduction of the participation margin
decreases the labor tightness volatility.
Even though the model is able to decrease the volatility of wages, it is still too
volatile. For that reason, an extension was made where only a fraction of workers
are able to renegotiate their salary each period. This staggered wage bargaining
model based on Gertler and Trigari (2009) [13] generates a recovery labor pattern
similar to the one seen in the great recession. That is, the GDP recovers faster
than the unemployment rate. Afterwards the employment rate goes back to its
pre-crisis level and lastly the labor market participation returns to its steady state
level. Therefore, the participation rate remains contracted longer than the other
labor market variables.
There are also other papers that link financial frictions and employment. Wes-
selbaum (2016) [27] established a link between financial frictions, by Tobin’s Q, and
labor market frictions, by the matching efficiency. Boeri et al (2017) [3] integrate the
labor search model of DMP with the Holmstrom and Tirole model of demand for liq-
uidity. They show that high leveraged firms tend to experience higher employment
losses during a recession. This paper is also related to Buera et al (2015)[4] that
created a model with heterogeneous agents and labor and credit market frictions.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
describes the calibration. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 presents an
extension. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2 Model
The following model describes an economy with two agents: households and firms.
Households work in the market for the firms and produce a home good. Non par-
ticipants (those not in the labor market) are fully dedicated to home production.
On the other hand, participants in the labor market are either employed or looking
for employment. The household consumes market and home goods and saves by
acquiring firm issued bonds.
Firms use capital and labor in production. Given a timing mismatch, firms need
to post vacancies and pay salaries and interests before the income from production
is received. For that reason, an intra-period loan is made where capital is used as
collateral. Therefore, capital has two functions. It is an input in the production
function and it is also used as collateral. A financial shock affects the amount of
collateral needed for the intra-period loan. Since capital is used also for production,
the financial shock has a direct impact on the firms capacity to post vacancies and
pay wages.
Households see the impact of financial shocks on their incentives to participate
in the labor market trough wages and the job finding probability. If, for example,
a financial shock generates a decrease in employment and wages, then households
would have an incentive to leave the labor market. This movement would mechan-
ically decrease the unemployment rate, not because jobs were created, but because
there is less people looking for work. Therefore, financial shocks have extra effects on
the labor market when participation is endogenous. The following section describes
the model in more detail from the perspective of each agent.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a representative household family of measure one
which is divided into workers, unemployed and those that are outside of the labor
market, the non-participants. It is assumed that there is perfect income insurance
within the household members. That is, agents within the household share their
resources like in Merz (1995) [18] and Andolfatto (1996) [1]. Consumption and a
home good, produced by those who are not working, enter the utility function that
reads:
U(c, h) =
C1−σt
1− σ + χ
h1−νt
1− ν (1)
Following Campolmi and Gnocchi (2016) [6], the home production function has
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the following form.
ht = (1− nt − Ut)1−αh (2)
Non-participants dedicate all of their time to home production, while those un-
employed spend all their time looking for employment.
The Household save in bonds (bt) issued by firms, pay a lump-sum tax (Tt) and
receive income from wages (wt), unemployment insurance (UIt) and dividends from
the firms (dt).
Therefore, the pooled budget constraint of the household is:
Ct +
bt+1
1 + rt
≤ bt + wtnt + dt + UIt − Tt (3)
2.2 Labor Market
At the beginning of each period, the firm chooses the amount of job vacancies posted
(vt). Then, the household chooses the measure, St, of agents that are going to search
for a job. Given, vt and St, a measure m(vt, St) of labor relations are formed. The
matching technology, originated from Den Haan et al (2000) [7], has the desired
properties that matching probabilities lie in the unit interval and has the following
form
m(vt, St) =
vtSt
(vγt + S
γ
t )
1/γ
(4)
The labor market tightness is θt =
vt
St
. Hence, the job finding rate is p(θt) =
m(vt,St)
St
and the job filling rate is q(θt) =
m(vt,st)
vt
. At the end of each period the mass
of, end of period, unemployed agents is ut = (1 − p(θt))St and the unemployment
rate is:
Ut =
ut
nt + ut
(5)
The timing of the events goes as follows. At the end of each quarter, an exogenous
proportion, δn, of workers get separated from their jobs. In the following period,
after st and vt are chosen, a measure m(vt, st) of labor relations are created. Once a
match is made, it becomes active in the same period. This is not a strong hypothesis
since a period corresponds to a quarter. Therefore, the employment rate evolves
according to the following law of motion
nt = (1− δn)nt−1 +m(vt, st) (6)
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2.3 Unemployment insurance
There is unemployment insurance in the economy. The unemployed are entitled to
the benefit w¯ for as long as they are unemployed. However, only those looking for a
job that lost their employment contract can receive the unemployment benefit. That
is, job seekers originated from outside the labor force are not entitled to receive it.
This distinction is necessary because, if all job seekers were entitled to the benefit,
those outside of the labor market would have an extra and unrealistic incentive
to search for a job. There is no informational problem in the economy. Policy
makers are able to verify perfectly who is unemployed. Hence, the government’s
total expenditure in unemployment insurance is
UIt =
∞∑
i=0
i∏
j=1
(1− p(θt−j))δnnt−iw¯
By this formula, it is required to keep track of the level of employment and the job
finding rate from t = 0 to t = −∞. In order to make the model more tractable and
remembering that the importance of past employment levels on the total amount of
unemployment insurance decreases exponentially, a simplifying assumption is made.
All employment rates and job finding probabilities from before t− 1 are assumed to
have its steady state value. That is, p(θt−j) = p(θ) and nt−j = n for j ≥ 2. Where
p(θ) and n are the respective steady state values. The formula becomes
UIt = w¯δn(1− p(θt))
(
nt−1 +
(1− p(θ))n
p(θ)
)
(7)
2.4 Problem of the Household
Given the above, the household solves the following problem:
H(nt−1, bt) = max
Ct,St,bt+1,nt
U(Ct, ht) + βEt [H(nt, bt+1)]
Ct +
bt+1
1 + r
≤ bt + wtnt + dt + UIt − Tt
nt = (1− δn)nt−1 + p(θ)St
(8)
Which delivers the following optimality conditions2
UCt = β(1 + rt)Et
[
UCt+1
]
(9)
2Detailed derivations and FOCs are in the appendix.
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Uhnt
P (θt)
= wtUCt + βEt
[
(1− P (θt+1))UCt+1
(
(1− δn)
P (θt+1)
Uhnt+1 + w¯δn
)]
(10)
Equation 9 is the standard Euller equation. Equation 10 is the optimality con-
dition for labor decisions. The cost of searching for a job, in the LHS, is equal to
the marginal benefit of the job plus its continuation value. From this equation it is
possible to verify the distortion caused by the labor market friction. If we assume
that the job finding probability is one, making the labor market perfect, we would
have that wt =
Uhnt
UCt
. Since there is no disutility from working in the model, the
equilibrium wage would be the marginal rate of substitution between the market
and home good. Deviations from this price indicate the magnitude of the market
imperfection.
2.5 Firms
There is a measure one of firms that maximize the stream of dividends dt subject
to the following budget constraint
F (at, kt, nt) +
bt+1
Rt
+ (1− δk)kt = ϕ(dt) + wtnt + kt+1 + gtvt + bt
where F (at, kt, nt) is the production function, bt is the firms’ debt issued to
households, Rt = 1+(1−τ)rt is the effective gross interest rate, it = kt+1−(1−δk)kt
is investment, vt is the number of job vacancy postings and gt = Γ is the cost of
posting a job vacancy. Since there are no idiosyncratic shocks in the model, there is
no reason for a firm to act differently from another one. Therefore, they are treated
as one representative firm.
Following Jermann and Quadrini (2012) [15] I assume that the firm’s payout
costs are quadratic.
ϕ(dt) = dt + κ
(
dt − d¯
)2
(11)
Where d¯ is the steady state value for dividend payout. This quadratic cost can be
justified by the firm shareholders’ preferences for a smooth distribution of dividends
throughout time. Gar´ın (2015) [12] instead of distributing dividends to households,
opted to make risk averse capitalists own the firms. In this way there is no need for
quadratic costs. Both modeling choices deliver the similar mechanics.
Since firms receive revenues after production takes place (but within the same
period) they need to make an intra-period loan, lt, to finance working capital. That
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is used to pay wages, vacancy costs, new capital investments and to refinance their
debt.
lt = ϕ(dt) + wtnt + kt+1 − (1− δk)kt + gtvt + bt − bt+1
Rt
= F (at, kt, nt)
Firms can choose to default the intra-period loan. If this happens, the firms
collateral, capital (kt), gets confiscated. However, there is a possibility, ξt, that
the collateral has no worth, in case of defaulting lt, the firms are subject to an
enforcement constraint.
ξt
(
kt+1 − bt+1
1 + r
)
≥ lt (12)
Where ξt is the probability that the collateral has value and the financier can use
the collateral. Jermann and Quadrini [15] showed that, if firms are bounded to this
collateral constraint, it is optimal to always make the intra-period loan repayment.
Using the definition of lt and replacing in the budget constraint, assuming τ = 0 for
expositional clarity, we have
ξt ((1− δk)kt − wtnt − bt − ϕ(dt)− gtvt) ≥ (1− ξt)F (at, kt, nt) (13)
If the economy is hit by a negative TFP shock (reduction in at), then the output,
ceteris paribus, would shrink relaxing the collateral constraint. This would allow the
firm to increase the number of workers or the amount of dividends paid. On the other
hand, if there is a decrease in ξt, the collateral constraint becomes more stringent
and the firms would need to decrease the amount of vacancies posted or dividends
paid.
2.6 Problem of the firm
Given the above description of the production sector, firms have the following prob-
lem.
V (nt−1, bt, kt) = max
dt,vt,kt+1,bt+1,nt
dt + E [βt,t+1V (nt, bt+1, kt+1)]
ϕ(dt) + wtnt + kt+1 − (1− δk)kt + gtvt + bt ≤ bt+1
Rt
+ F (at, kt, nt) (λ1)
nt = (1− δn)nt−1 + q(θt)vt (λ2)
ξt
(
kt+1 − bt+1
1 + r
)
≥ F (at, kt, nt) (µ)
(14)
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where λ1, λ2 and µ are the Lagrange multipliers. The optimality conditions of
this problem are3
Et
[
βt,t+1
(
((1− δk) + Fkt+1)
ϕd(dt+1)
− µt+1Fkt+1
)]
+ ξtµt =
1
ϕd(dt)
(15)
Et
[
βt,t+1
(1− δn)gt+1
ϕd(dt+1)q(θt+1)
]
+
[Fnt − wt]
ϕd(dt)
− gt
ϕd(dt)q(θt)
= µtFnt (16)
ξtµtRtϕd(dt)
1 + rt
+ Et
[
βt,t+1
ϕd(dt)Rt
ϕd(dt+1)
]
= 1 (17)
Equation 15 presents the firm’s optimality condition with respect to capital.
It is possible to see two sources of frictions. The marginal dividend payout cost
ϕd(dt) and collateral constraint measured by the Lagrange multiplier µ. If none
of these frictions were present, that is, ϕd(dt) = 1 and µ = 0, in the steady state
we would have that Fk =
1
β
+ δk = r + δk. The model would deliver the optimal
amount of capital. Since ϕd(dt) 6= 1 outside the steady state, if we assume that
ϕd(dt) ≥ ϕd(dt+1) the resulting marginal product of capital would be higher than
the optimal one. That is, there would be less capital in the economy. However, µ
has the opposite effect on the economy. There would be more capital in equilibrium.
Equation 16 presents the firm’s optimality condition with respect to labor. There
are three sources of frictions, two financial and one from the labor market. If no
frictions were present, the conditions would become Fnt = wt. If there were no
search frictions, gt = 0, the condition would be Fnt =
ϕd(dt)wt
1−µt . Both of these
frictions increase the cost of the firm and, therefore, the labor demand is smaller
than optimal.
2.7 Wage determination
The equilibrium wage is determined by Nash bargaining. When a match occurs,
the newly hired employee and the employer split the surplus of the match. For the
worker, the outside option is to become unemployed and for the firm the outside
option is to lose the match and have to wait another period to fill the vacancy.
The marginal surplus of working for the household is
HEt
Uc
= wt − Uhn
Uc
+ Et
[
β
Uc
(
(1− δn(1− p(θt+1))HEt+1 + δn(1− p(θt+1))HUt+1
)]
(18)
The marginal surplus of losing a job and becoming unemployed for the household
3Detailed derivations are in the appendix.
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is
HUt
Uc
= w¯ − Uhn
Uc
+ Et
[
β
Uc
(
p(θt+1)H
E
t+1 + (1− p(θt+1))HUt+1
)]
(19)
The marginal surplus of an additional worker for the firm is
∂Vt
∂nt
|v=vt = V jt =
Fnt − wt
ϕd(dt)
− µtFnt + Et
[
βt,t+1((1− δn)V jt+1 + δnV vt+1)
]
(20)
Given the free entry condition we have that the value of an additional vacancy
for the firm is zero. Therefore,
V jt =
gt
ϕd(dt)q(θt)
(21)
Since wages are determined by Nash bargaining, the agreed wage rate is the one
where a fraction η of the overall match surplus is allocated to the worker and a
fraction (1− η) to the firms. Therefore, its possible to derive the following solution4
(1− η)
[
HEt −HUt
Uc
]
= ηϕd(dt)V
j
t (22)
Using 18,19, 21 and 22 it is possible determine the wage equation that has the
following form.
wt =η(1− µtϕd(dt))Fnt + (1− η)w¯+
Et
[
βt,t+1η
(
ϕd(dt)
ϕd(dt+1)
− (1− p(θt+1))
)
(1− δn) gt+1
q(θt+1)
] (23)
The resulting bargaining outcome in Equation 23 shows that shocks have non
trivial effects on the equilibrium wage. A negative TFP shock will decrease the
marginal product of labor (Fnt). However, as shown in Equation 13 the same shock
relaxes the collateral constraint and diminishes µt. Therefore, it is unclear how a
negative TFP shock affects wages.
The friction deriving from the dividend costs also play a role on wages. The
higher the friction, smaller the equilibrium wage will be. However, there is also a
dynamic effect. If firms expect the friction to increase, that is ϕd(dt+1) > ϕd(dt),
then wages will go down.
4Detailed derivations are in the appendix
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2.8 Government
The government collects a lump-sum tax Tt in order to finance the subsidies to the
firms borrowing, the unemployment insurance and its own expenses (G). Therefore,
the government budget constraint is
Tt = bt+1/Rt − bt+1/(1 + rt) +G+ UIt (24)
2.9 Equilibrium
The equilibrium can be defined by the equations 9, 10 12, 15, 16, 17, 23, and the
households, firms and government budget constraint.
Is good to notice that given the financial frictions, the collateral constraint is
always binding in the steady state.
Proposition 1. The collateral constraint is binding in the non-stochastic steady
state.
Proof. Suppose not, that is µ = 0. Then, Equation 17 reads
βR = 1
and from Equation 9 we have
β(1 + r) = 1
Therefore, R = (1 + r) ⇐⇒ τ = 0
3 Calibration
Table 2 shows the values used in the calibration of the model. Most values like
the households’ risk aversion and the discount factor are standard in the literature.
The parameters concerning home production ν and αh come from Campolmi and
Gnocchi (2016) [6]. The utility from home production χ was set so that 30% of
households would be non-participants. The steady state level of the lender recovery
probability, ξ, was set so that the ratio between bonds and GDP would be 2.3. The
dividend deviation cost κ and the matrix A comes from the recalibration done by
Pfeifer (2016) [20]. The government parameters G and τ are from Jermann and
Quadrini (2012) [15]. The labor market parameters were set to match the steady
state level of unemployment of 6% and the labor market tightness of 0.8. The labor
separation rate and depreciation of capital are also standard. The first column of
Table 3 shows the steady state values of the model.
13
Table 2: Calibration values
Symbol Description Value
σ Risk aversion 2
ν Labor utility curvature parameter 5
χ Preference for home over market goods 0.06
w¯ replacement rate of the unemployment insurance 0.5
α Marginal return to labor 1/3
αh Marginal return to labor in home good 1/3
β Discount factor 0.9926
κ dividend deviation cost 0.08
η Worker’s bargaining power 0.5
γ Matching function efficiency 2
ξ Lender recovery probability 0.115
G Government purchases 0.66
τ Tax 0.35
Γ Vacancy posting cost 1.15
δn Labor separation rate 0.1
δk Capital depreciation 0.025
A Matrix for the shocks process
[
0.9736 −0.0287
0.1509 0.9363
]
The Financial efficiency (ξt) and productivity (at) variables follow the same struc-
ture as in Jermann and Quadrini(2012) [15]. That is(
aˆt
ξˆt
)
= A
(
aˆt−1
ξˆt−1
)
+
(
εat
εξt
)
(25)
Table 3 shows the steady state values achieved with the described calibration.
It is worth noting that the steady state in the two other versions of the model, with
exogenous labor participation and staggered wages, are identical to the one in the
full model.
4 Results
Table 4 shows the relative business cycles standard deviations based on the US data
(described in the appendix), and the data produced by several specifications of the
model. All variables were detrended according to the method suggested by Hamilton
(2017) [14], using a forecasting horizon (h) of 8 periods and a linear projection using
the variables’ four most recent values (p=4).
The model was calibrated so that the relative volatility of the labor force would
be equal to the one seen in the data. Row (ii) shows the variables’ volatility of the
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Table 3: Steady state
Variable Value Variable Value
Product (Y ) 2.15 Employment (n) 0.65
Capital (K) 23.44 Unemployment rate (U) 0.06
Investment (I) 0.59 Job seekers (S) 0.11
Consumption (C) 0.80 Labor force (LF ) 0.69
Home production (h) 0.46 Vacancies (v) 0.08
Dividends (d) 0.15 Labor market tightness (θ) 0.78
Bonds (b) 4.81 p(θ) 0.61
Wage (w) 1.99 q(θ) 0.79
full model. That is, the model with endogenous participation and flexible wages.
Row (iii) shows the volatility for the model without the participation margin. The
table shows that the introduction of the participation margin increases the volatility
of employment, bringing it closer to the data, and decreases the volatility of wages
when compared with the model with the exogenous labor force.
This improvement comes with a decrease in the volatility of unemployment, and
labor market tightness (θ). Since, now, households can optimally choose the amount
of agents in the labor market. They do so as a consumption smoothing mechanism.
Therefore, this result adds strength to the Shimer puzzle. If search and matching
model of the labor market were able to generate the correct volatility of labor market
tightness, the model with exogenous participation would lead to an overestimation
of the volatility.
As seen in the literature, Vercierto (2008) [26] and Ravn (2008) [21], search
and matching models with endogenous participation produce three counterfactual
results. A positive correlation between GDP and unemployment, and between un-
employment and vacancies, and a negative correlation between the labor force and
GDP.
Rows (vi) and (vii) of Table 4 show the standard deviation of the full model when
only the financial or TFP shocks are present. In both specifications, the volatility
of all labor market variables increases. The puzzling part of this result is why the
labor market volatility decreases once we combine both shocks. Table 5 shows the
these three correlation for both models. The full model, with financial friction but
only with TFP shocks, still produces a pro-cyclical unemployment rate. However,
the model with only financial shocks produces correlations in line with the data.
Therefore, the volatility of the labor market decreases when the model has both
shocks because of the TFP shock, which produces movements in a counterfactual
direction and curbs the total volatility of the model.
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Table 6 and Table 7 show the correlations of the model with and without the
endogenous participation margin. It is possible to see that the full model is able to
generate correlations in the right direction.
Table 4: Relative standard deviation
Y U v θ n w LF I
(i) Data 1 6.42 6.59 12.71 0.63 0.67 0.24 4.08
(ii) Full model 1 4.55 4.10 3.62 0.47 1.17 0.24 3.02
(iii) Exo model 1 6.34 4.31 5.09 0.41 1.41 - 3.00
(iv) Staggered wage 1 5.03 4.39 4.06 0.50 0.82 0.23 3.00
(v) Staggered wage (exo) 1 6.82 4.66 5.45 0.44 0.95 - 2.97
(vi) Only financial shocks 1 9.07 10.03 7.65 1.07 1.93 0.59 2.85
(vii) Only TFP shocks 1 5.77 5.70 4.74 0.58 1.33 0.35 3.00
Table 5: Selected correlations of models with only one shock
TFP shocks Financial shocks
corr(U, Y ) 0.05 -0.75
corr(U, v) -0.40 -0.37
corr(LF, Y ) 0.31 0.63
Table 6: Correlation Matrix (full model)
Y U v θ n w LF I
Y 1 -0.74 0.44 0.71 0.63 0.96 0.39 0.97
U 1 -0.44 -0.87 -0.92 -0.89 -0.59 -0.72
v 1 0.82 0.68 0.67 0.79 0.28
θ 1 0.95 0.94 0.82 0.61
n 1 0.87 0.83 0.58
w 1 0.65 0.83
LF 1 0.38
Figure 3 Shows the IRF of a negative financial shock to the full model and the
one with exogenous participation. This shock represents a decrease in the collateral
recovery probabiliry (ξt). Following the shock firms are obliged to reduce their
intertemporal loan given the increase in collateral requirements. Hence, there is a
reduction in vacancies and investment. Since the job destruction rate is constant,
by assumption, there is a reduction in employment that leads to a reduction in
production. In the exogenous participation case, all the job losses are transformed
into unemployment. However, when the participation is endogenous, agents can
leave the labor market and dedicate themselves to home production. Therefore, the
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Table 7: Correlation Matrix (Exogenous LF)
Y U v θ n w I
Y 1 -0.62 0.42 0.58 0.63 0.82 0.97
U 1 -0.74 -0.96 -1.00 -0.94 -0.54
v 1 0.93 0.74 0.77 0.25
θ 1 0.96 0.93 0.47
n 1 0.94 0.55
w 1 0.73
impact of financial shocks on unemployment is halved when agents can leave the
labor market.
Figure 3: IRF of a negative financial shock(at)
As noted by Gar´ın (2015) [12] even if the framework with collateral constraints
improves the performance of the model, it also generates a counterfactual result,
the increase in consumption following a negative financial shock. After the shock,
firms decrease their level of borrowing. Since households are now saving less, they
balance their budget constraint by consuming more. As is shown in Figure 4, the
introduction of endogenous labor supply reduces the increase in consumption, but
does not make this counterfactual result disappear. Even if the importance of finan-
cial shocks on consumption is negligible when compared with TFP shocks. Adding
17
another saving mechanism option to households could dissipate this result.
Figure 4: IRF of a negative productivity shock(at)
Figure 4 shows the IRF of a negative TFP shock to the full model and the one
with exogenous participation. Following a negative TFP shock, there is a decrease
in production and investment. However, the drop in employment is greater in the
endogenous case even if the increase in unemployment is slightly smaller. This
happens because households leave the labor market given the adverse job finding
probabilities. Since now there are less people looking for employment, the amount
of new matches decrease.
Since the households are better off with the participation margin, which gives
them an extra mechanism to smooth the impact of negative shocks - if they were
not, the optimal behavior would be to keep the labor force constant - the outside
option of working is improved (when compared with the exogenous participation
case). Their bargaining position is improved and the drop in wages is mitigated.
Therefore, the drop in consumption is smaller in the endogenous participation case.
4.1 Variance decomposition
In order to understand the magnitude and importance of financial shocks on the
economy and on the labor market, the variance decomposition of the TFP and Fi-
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Table 8: Variance decomposition
Variable TFP shock Credit shock
Product (Y ) 0.8463 0.1537
Unemployment (U) 0.2727 0.7273
Vacancies (v) 0.5437 0.4563
θ 0.0939 0.9061
Employment (n) 0.3809 0.6191
Wage (w) 0.6591 0.3409
Labor Force (LF ) 0.1448 0.8552
Investment (I) 0.8712 0.1288
nancial shocks were computed. The results can be seen in Table 8. GDP, investment
and wages are predominantly influenced by the TFP shock and the labor market
variables (unemployment, employment, labor market tightness and participation
rate) are mostly influenced by the financial shock. This asserts the importance of
financial shock on the economy and, in particular, the labor market.
The variance decomposition was also calculated for the model with exogenous
participation. The results, available in Table 10 in the appendix, are quite similar to
the ones of the full model. The main difference is that in the exogenous participation
case, the financial shocks gain extra importance in the volatility of labor market
variables.
5 Staggered wage bargaining
In the following section, an extension of the full model is elaborated. It aims to
address the small variance of the labor market tightness and the high volatility of
wages. This is done by not allowing every labor relation to renegotiate their wages
every period.
As pointed out by Shimer (2005) [23] search and matching models deliver too
little movement in the labor market tightness when compared to output. The data
shows that the standard deviation of the former is 12 times higher than the latter,
as seen in Table 4. The reason for that is the high volatility of wages. Shocks are
absorbed by price adjustments and, as a result, the labor market quantities do not
vary much.
To be able to dampen the high variance of wages, I use the fact that wages are
not renegotiated every period. As in Gertler and Trigari (2009) [13], I assume that
only a fraction (quarter) of firms are able to renegotiate wages in each period. There
is no nominal of real wage rigidity, the introduction of staggered wages only makes
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wages less responsive to shocks.
As it can be seen in Table 4, the introduction of staggered wage bargaining is
able to decrease the standard deviation of wages and increase the standard deviation
of the labor market tightness.
Figure 5 and Figure 6 compares the impulse response originated from a negative
financial and TFP shock to the model with staggered wages and the baseline model
(when all the wages are renegotiated every period). There are minor differences
between the responses of both models to a financial shock. However, the model
produces significantly different responses to a TFP shock. Since, now, firms can-
not renegotiate all wages, there is a greater reduction in investment and vacancies
following the shock.
Notice, that now the shock generates a positive response on the labor market.
The costs to participate in the labor market increased since the job finding proba-
bility decreased together with the labor market tightness. However, the benefit of
participating in the labor market increased since the wages did not decrease as much
as in the baseline and the reduction of consumption increased the marginal utility
of consumption.
Figure 5: IRFs Staggered wage bargaining (financial shock)
Figure 7 shows the IRF of GDP, employment, unemployment and the labor force
for the model with staggered wage bargaining. We can see that the unemployment
20
Figure 6: IRFs Staggered wage bargaining (TFP shock)
Figure 7: Labor market recovery to a financial shock
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rate recovers to its pre-shock level before the employment rate and the labor force
participation has an even slower recovery. This picture fits with the aftermath of the
financial crisis when the unemployment rate recovered to its pre-crisis level and the
employment rate was still depressed. This late response of the participation margin
is also on par with lagged correlation between GDP and labor force participation seen
in Figure 2 and the recovery rate of the US labor market after the great recession. It
is worth noticing that this jobless recovery effect - Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2017)
[22] - completely disappears without the endogenous participation margin5.
6 Final remarks
In this article I show the importance of the labor participation margin amid financial
frictions. This was done by incorporating the labor participation margin in a model
with search and matching frictions in the labor market, and financial market frictions
in the form of collateral constraints.
One of the main problems of models with endogenous participation is that they
produce counterfactual moments. This paper shows that the introduction of fi-
nancial shocks is key for generating realistic moments. Also, the same model with
collateral constraints but without financial shocks still produces counterfactual re-
sults.
The labor market participation generates an extra mechanism for which the
household can smooth consumption and utility. For that reason, the volatility of the
labor market tightness is reduced. This result gives strength to the Shimer puzzle
since it demonstrates that models with exogenous participation would naturally
overestimate the labor market volatility.
Moreover, the model, when extended with staggered wage bargaining, produces
an asymmetric recovery of the labor market variables to a financial shock. The
unemployment rate recovers faster than the employment and labor force. This
behavior mimics the recovery of the US economy after the great recession.
5Figure 8 in the appendix.
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A Appendix: Detailed derivations
A.1 Problem of the Household
Given the above, the household solves the following problem:
H(nt−1, bt) = max
Ct,St,bt+1,nt
U(Ct, ht) + βEt [H(nt, bt+1)]
Ct +
bt+1
1 + r
≤ bt + wtnt + dt + UIt − Tt (λ1)
nt = (1− δn)nt−1 + p(θ)St (λ2)
(26)
FOCs
Ct : UCt − λ1t = 0
St : −χu(1− p(θt))UhE + p(θt)λ2t = 0
where UhE = χh
−ν
t (1− αh)(1− nt − χu(1− p(θt))St)−αh
bt+1 : βHbt+1 −
λ1t
1 + rt
= 0
where Hbt+1 = Et [λ1t+1], therefore,
UCt = β(1 + rt)Et
[
UCt+1
]
(27)
nt : −UhE + βHnt + wtλ1t − λ2t = 0
where Hnt = (1− δn)λ2t+1 + δn(1− p(θt)λ1t
Uhnt
P (θt)
= wtUCt + βEt
[
(1− P (θt+1))UCt+1
(
(1− δn)
P (θt+1)
Uhnt+1 + w¯δn
)]
(28)
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A.2 Problem of the firm
Given the above description of the production sector, firms have the following prob-
lem.
V (nt−1, bt, kt) = max
dt,vt,kt+1,bt+1,nt
dt + E [βt,t+1V (nt, bt+1, kt+1)]
ϕ(dt) + wtnt + kt+1 − (1− δk)kt + gtvt + bt ≤ bt+1
Rt
+ F (at, kt, nt) (λ1)
nt = (1− δn)nt−1 + q(θt)vt (λ2)
ξt
(
kt+1 − bt+1
1 + r
)
≥ F (at, kt, nt) (µ)
(29)
FOCs
dt : 1− ϕd(dt)λ1t = 0
vt : −gtλ1t + q(θt)λ2t = 0
kt+1 : Et
[
βt,t+1Vkt+1
]− λ1t + ξtµt = 0
bt+1 : Et
[
βt,t+1Vbt+1
]
+
λ1t
Rt
− ξtµt
1 + rt
= 0
Et : Et [βt,t+1VEt ] + (Fnt − wt)λ1t − λ2t − Fntµt = 0
Envelope conditions
Vkt = [(1− δk) + Fkt ]λ1t − Fktµt
Vnt−1 = (1− δn)λ2t
Vbt = −λ1t
Et
[
βt,t+1
(
((1− δk) + Fkt+1)
ϕd(dt+1)
− µt+1Fkt+1
)]
+ ξtµt =
1
ϕd(dt)
(30)
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Et
[
βt,t+1
(1− δn)gt+1
ϕd(dt+1)q(θt+1)
]
+
[Fnt − wt]
ϕd(dt)
− gt
ϕd(dt)q(θt)
= µtFnt (31)
ξtµtRtϕd(dt)
1 + rt
+ Et
[
βt,t+1
ϕd(dt)Rt
ϕd(dt+1)
]
= 1 (32)
A.3 Wage determination
The marginal surplus of an additional worker for the household is
HEt
Uc
= wt − UhE
Uc
+ Et
[
β
Uc
(
(1− δn(1− p(θt+1))HEt+1 + δn(1− p(θt+1))HUt+1
)]
(33)
HUt
Uc
= w¯ − χU UhE
Uc
+ Et
[
β
Uc
(
p(θt+1)H
E
t+1 + (1− p(θt+1))HUt+1
)]
(34)
HEt −HUt
Uc
= wt − w¯ + Et
[
β
Uc
(
(1− δn)((1− p(θt+1))[HEt+1 −HUt+1]
)]
(35)
The marginal surplus of an additional worker for the firm is
∂Vt
∂nt
|v=vt = V jt =
Fnt − wt
ϕd(dt)
− µtFnt + Et
[
βt,t+1((1− δn)V jt+1 + δnV vt+1)
]
(36)
Given the free entry condition we have that the value of an additional vacancy
for the firm is zero. Therefore,
V vt =
−gt
ϕd(dt)
+ q(θt)V
j
t + (1− q(θt))Et
[
βt,t+1V
v
t+1
]
V jt =
gt
ϕd(dt)q(θt)
(37)
Wages are determined by Nash bargaining.
wt = argmax
[
HEt −HUt
Uc
]η (
V jt
)1−η
= argmax η ln
(
HEt −HUt
Uc
)
+ (1− η) lnV jt
(38)
Therefore, its possible to derive the following solution
(1− η)
[
HEt −HUt
Uc
]
= ηϕd(dt)V
j
t (39)
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Using 35, 37 and 39 it is possible determine the wage equation that has the
following form.
wt =η(1− µtϕd(dt))Fnt + (1− η)w¯+
Et
[
βt,t+1η
(
ϕd(dt)
ϕd(dt+1)
− (1− p(θt+1))
)
(1− δn) gt+1
q(θt+1)
] (40)
B Appendix: Data description
The data used in the paper were taken from FRED and have the following codes:
Table 9: Data description
LRUN64TTUSQ156S Unemployment Rate: Aged 15-64: All Persons for the United
States, Percent, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted
JTSJOL Job Openings: Total Nonfarm, Level in Thousands,
Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted
LREM64TTUSQ156S Employment Rate: Aged 15-64: All Persons for the United
States, Percent, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted
UNEMPLOY Unemployment Level, Thousands of Persons, Quarterly,
Seasonally Adjusted
LRAC64TTUSQ156S Activity Rate: Aged 15-64: All Persons for the United States,
Percent, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted
CES0500000003 Average Hourly Earnings of All Employees: Total Private,
Dollars per Hour, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted
A939RX0Q048SBEA Real gross domestic product per capita, Chained 2009
Dollars, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate
LES1252881600Q Employed full time: Median usual weekly real earnings: Wage
and salary workers: 16 years and over, 1982-84 CPI Adjusted
Dollars, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted
DRTSCILM Net Percentage of Domestic Banks Tightening Standards for
Commercial and Industrial Loans to Large and Middle-Market
Firms, Percent, Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted
GPDI Gross Private Domestic Investment, Billions of Dollars,
Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate
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C Appendix: Exogenous labor force
Figure 8: Labor market recovery to a financial shock (Exogenous participation)
Table 10: Variance decomposition
Variable TFP shock Credit shock
Y 0.8308 0.1692
U 0.3206 0.6794
v 0.3246 0.6754
θ 0.0898 0.9102
n 0.2297 0.7703
w 0.5414 0.4586
lf - -
I 0.8776 0.1224
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D Appendix: Staggered wage model
Table 11: Correlations - staggered wage model
Y U v θ n w lf I
Y 1 -0.86 0.49 0.80 0.72 0.87 0.39 0.97
U 1 -0.52 -0.89 -0.93 -0.93 -0.63 -0.84
v 1 0.85 0.67 0.36 0.74 0.32
θ 1 0.93 0.75 0.77 0.70
n 1 0.78 0.85 0.67
w 1 0.47 0.84
lf 1 0.32
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